Abstract: Containing inflation has turned out to be one of the most challenging aspects of economic management in Iraq since the invasion in 2003. This paper posits that conventional as well as unconventional factors explain inflation dynamics in the recent past. We build a theoretical model based on the insights into the workings of socialist economies under supply shortages in Shleifer and Vishny model to help explain price dynamics. In the model, strategic behavior of the distribution monopolist results in fuel shortages, with implications for fuel and non-fuel inflation. A number of discrete adjustments of administered prices for fuel products since December 2005 offer an interesting experiment to help study this behavior using the Shleifer-Vishny model. Our estimates confirm presence of strategic behavior in price fuel price setting and show that inflation was influenced by shortages in fuel supplies and by violence.
Introduction
Containing high inflation has turned out to be one of the most challenging aspects of managing Iraq's economy since the invasion in March 2003. The persistent violence, commodity shortages, pervasive dollarization, a weak monetary transmission mechanism, and lack of data all contributed to the difficulties in designing and implementing policies to bring down high inflation. We argue that rent-seeking behavior in the oil sector, in addition to widespread violence, was key contributing factor to the surge in inflation and can also help explain some of the stylized facts about inflation characteristics in Iraq since 2003.
We build a theoretical model based on the insights into the workings of socialist economies under supply shortages provided by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) . In our model, the strategic behavior of the oil sector distribution monopoly results in fuel shortages, with implications for fuel and non-fuel inflation. The adjustments of administered prices for fuel products that took place in 2005-07 offer an interesting experiment to help study this behavior using the Shleifer-Vishny model.
1 While these adjustments were intended to gradually eliminate direct budgetary subsidies and reduce smuggling, they also had implications for inflation through the black market premia for fuel products. While the latter increased in the first half of 2006, they leveled off thereafter and black market premia relative to official prices declined. 2 The predictions of the model are confirmed by the econometric estimation of the inflation equation using data for 2003-07. One caveat is in order here. Our efforts to analyze the underlying inflation trend are hampered by data limitations that prevent estimating the deviations from, and adjustment toward, long-run values of fundamentals. For example, one factor that we are unable to appropriately account for is the movements in the equilibrium real exchange rate that has likely been appreciated because of the terms-of-trade improvements observed during the period under review.
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 discusses inflation developments in Iraq in 2003-07 and the policy response aimed at bringing inflation down. From the picture that emerges we derive four stylized facts about recent inflation developments in Iraq. Section 3 discusses the links between commodity shortages, violence, and inflation and presents a model that explains how rent-seeking in the oil sector can lead to shortages and subsequently inflation.
3 Section 4 presents the empirical investigation. Section 5 concludes and offers some policy recommendations.
1 Starting in December 2005, with further adjustments in the second half of 2006 and in 2007, the price of regular gasoline has been increased from less than 3 U.S. dollar cents per liter to 32 U.S. dollar cents per liter, above the average in other oil-exporting countries in the region. Similar price adjustments have also been implemented for premium gasoline, diesel, LPG, and kerosene.
2 The average ratio of black market to administered prices declined from approximately 4.3 following the December 2005 adjustment to 2.8 following the January 2007 adjustment.
3 Inflation refers to both off-equilibrium price increases (captured in the model by shortages) as well as increases in the equilibrium price level (captured in the model by violence, a proxy for expectations of future policy changes).
2 Background: inflation, oil sector governance, and violence
Inflation
Maintaining macroeconomic stability while at the same time rebuilding oil infrastructure were key policy objectives in Iraq after the invasion in March 2003. To achieve these objectives the Coalition Provisional Authority and two consecutive Iraqi governments attempted to control current government spending so as to limit inflationary pressures in the small non-oil economy and to make room in the budget for reconstruction spending, in particular for the oil sector. A stable exchange rate was to serve as an anchor for monetary policy. It was envisaged that these policies would be able to keep inflation in the single digits in 2004 and slightly higher in 2005 (IMF 2007 . Inflation turned out to be much higher than projected, reaching 65% by end-2006. 4 Historically, Iraq is not a high-inflation country. Foote, Block, and Gray (2004) point out that between 1945 and 1989 inflation usually stayed in the single digits. Only after the first Gulf war and the following UN Embargo did inflation surge to nearly 500%, as the government began to monetize its fiscal deficits. The rest of the paper attempts to explain these stylized facts.
Oil sector and supply of fuel products
The Iraqi Ministry of Oil (MoO) has made efforts to increase crude oil available for domestic refining to increase the supply of fuel products. In the period 2005-07 it managed to increase the supply of crude oil to refineries by about 50%. However, the efforts to increase the supply of fuel products were hampered by outdated refining infrastructure and by violence. The government budgets made room for substantial investment in the oil and non-oil sectors, but violence and limited administrative capacity kept the rate of implementation of the investment budget low. The resulting under-investment in the oil sector prevented a significant expansion in crude oil production and refining capacity of fuel products. Only toward the end of 2007 these efforts began to bear fruit and domestic usage increased to about 700,000 barrels per day, from 300,000-500,000 barrels per day throughout most of 2005-07. To help satisfy growing domestic demand for fuel products, the government started importing fuel products. In 2005-06, it spent ID 8.9 trillion ($6.1 billion) on refined fuel product imports (IMF 2007).
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MoO acts as both the manager and the regulator of the oil sector. One of the agencies under the umbrella of the MoO is the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), which operates as a quasi-independent agency. In the absence of private sector oil distributors in Iraq, SOMO has been responsible for importing and distributing imported and domestically refined fuel products through the state-owned gas stations and storage facilities.
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Despite substantial government fuel imports, fuel shortages in 2006 were severe and widespread. A survey conducted by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) in 2006 showed that queuing times at gas stations varied from 1-5 hours in Baghdad to more than 24 hours in some of the more remote districts. Some gas stations in the Kurdish north are believed to have only supplied gasoline to taxis. According to a BBC survey conducted in early 2007, 88% of Iraqis reported that the availability of "fuel for cooking or driving" was "quite bad" or "very bad". Widespread smuggling undermined the government's efforts to increase supply of fuel products. Even in March 2007, when official gasoline prices in Iraq had tripled to ID 300 per liter from ID 100 per liter in March 2006, the black market price was still about 40% lower than the market price in neighboring Jordan. Another factor that worked against the government's efforts to reduce shortages is that expansionary fiscal policies and an inflow of foreign currency increased demand for fuel products, which higher official fuel prices could not curtail.
Violence
Violence has a direct impact on the ability of economic agents to produce and distribute goods. This effect is especially pronounced for fuel products, 12 where there have been significant supply interruptions as a result of attacks on the oil sector infrastructure. 13 In particular, the northern crude oil export pipeline to
Turkey was a frequent target and has been shut down due to insurgent attacks for most of 2006. In addition to three large refineries, the country has numerous small refineries and dozens of pumping stations and storage facilities, all of which are vulnerable to attack. The pipeline network for refined fuel products in Iraq stretches hundreds of miles. According to information collected by the Brookings Institution, oil installations were attacked on average twice a week during 2006 (see Figure 2 ). The level and intensity of violence also steadily increased in the sample period under review. In the second half of 2003 the average number of civilians killed per day was 17. From mid-2006, this number has more than quadrupled, while in the same period the number of bombings with multiple casualties increased from 7 per month to 57 per month. Underlying this rising trend in violence is significant variation in the timing and pattern of violence across different governorates in Iraq (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2008) . In addition to causing supply constraints, sustained violence could also affect agents' expectations and, as a result, their current behavior. It might shape expectations of the government's ability to maintain security, collect revenues, and secure macroeconomic stability, which in turn may offer insights into the future availability of basic commodities at predictable prices, the government's ability to close its fiscal gaps as well as the need to monetize the deficit. 
The model
The basic hypothesis behind the analysis is that rent-seeking behavior in oil distribution activities as well as severe and worsening security conditions could result in shortages of fuel products supplied and eventually create shortages on the market for non-oil goods, fueling inflation. The theoretical model is based on the insights into the workings of socialist economies under supply shortages provided by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) . In Shleifer and Vishny's model, selfinterested centralized planners -bureaucrats in the ministries and the managers of state owned enterprises -maximize the rents they extract from running the public sector. Since they cannot keep the official profits that the state-owned companies earn, they create shortages of output to collect rents from consumers. We apply this model to the situation in Iraq.
As established by Lamont (1995) , shortages cause gradual price adjustments and inflation, suggesting that disequilibrium could be an important part of the adjustment process of prices to shocks. Measuring shortages by simply observing price-quantity combinations, however, is not possible because supply and demand are not observable separately. One way to measure shortages would be to estimate the equilibrium relationship between prices and quantities in "tranquil times" and then define the shortage as the distance between the implied equilibrium quantities and the observed quantities. But this is not possible in Iraq's context of the time in question, which was anything but tranquil. We will, therefore, follow Lamont's approach and attempt to find a viable proxy that would sufficiently closely predict the existence of shortages. Given the institutional arrangements of fuel distribution in Iraq, we think that the administered prices for fuel products could serve as a reasonable (inverse) proxy for shortages. The empirical evidence presented below tends to confirm this.
In addition to the link between fuel shortages and fuel price increases, there is also likely to be a relationship between fuel prices and core inflation, as shown in Humpage and Pelz (2002) . The strength of the transmission channel from oil shortages to prices of non-oil goods will eventually depend on the ability of the private sector in Iraq to substitute between oil and other inputs of production and distribution of non-oil goods. We expect that the security situation in Iraq at the time would have limited the extent of this substitution.
To model core and non-core inflation dynamics, we consider two sectors of the Iraqi economy: production and distribution of (domestic and imported) fuel products and the non-oil economy. In the first sector, the monopolist faces two prices: the administered price set by the central government and the black market price at which he could potentially sell fuel products, if he could suppress the supply of fuel products and create a shortage. The costs for the monopolist are the administered prices of fuel since this is the amount that needs to be transferred to the budget for every liter of fuel sold. The black market price is his revenue. The imported price of fuel is irrelevant for the monopolist because this was actually paid for by the government. The difference between the administrated price and the black market price times the quantity of fuel sold is the potential rent for the monopolist.
The monopolist's objective function is thus presented as follows:
where DðQÞ is the (downward-slopping) inverse demand curve for oil products sold at any quantity Q and P a is the administered price of goods ( Figure 3 ). Maximizing Rent with respect to Q produces the following firstorder condition:
The term on the left is the marginal revenue curve of the monopolist, MRðQÞ. Eq.
[2] implies that the monopolist supplies the market with products until his marginal revenue equals the administered price (i.e. his marginal cost). The implication of this condition -and a reflection of the power of the monopolist to Figure 3 : Basic incentive set-up of the monopolist remain off the demand curve -is that the market would be forced to operate at ðQ a ; P bm Þ combination of output and price, where P bm is the black market price. The rent that the monopolist would collect is equal to the difference between the black market prices and the administered prices for every unit of fuel products sold (the shaded area in Figure 3 ). Note that P bm is still below the international price of fuel products, P Ã , because it is more profitable for the monopolist to operate at ðQ a ; P bm Þ rather than at ðQ Ã ; P Ã Þ, even though the latter combination has a higher price. Indeed, if it was not for the strategic motivation of the monopolist to manipulate supply, black market prices would have been at P Ã all the time.
The horizontal difference between the demand and marginal revenue curves at P ¼ P a [and between the demand curve and Q a at any price P 2 ðP a ; P bm Þ] represents the supply shortage. The shortage becomes zero at P ¼ P bm . An important corollary to this basic set-up is that, other things being equal, higher administrative prices are associated with smaller shortages. This is the result of falling demand and the resulting shrinking room for the monopolist to maneuver. Also, the model suggests that higher administrative fuel prices, and hence lower potential rents, will lead to less shortages, which is consistent with actual developments in Iraq in the period 2006-08.
To sum up, in the presence of monopolistic behavior, at any administered price there will be a shortage of fuel, which would drive the black market price upward to eventually clear the market. The one exception, when black market prices converge toward international prices P bm ¼ P Ã ð Þ , is discussed below. Figure 4 illustrates the response of the black market prices and quantities supplied to the market to an upward adjustment in the administered prices from P a to P 0 a . Consistent with eq.
Response to administered price adjustments
[2], the monopolist will reduce the quantity of fuel products supplied to the market along the marginal revenue curve. As a result, black market prices would increase to reach P 0 bm > P bm , with fuel shortages declining as the difference between the demand and marginal revenue curves shrinks.
Once the administered price is high enough (at P 00 a ) so that the corresponding black market price reaches the international level, P 00 bm ¼ P Ã (point B, Figure 5 ), the monopolist has no incentives to further reduce supply, since he no longer has the ability to charge more by providing less to the market. At that point his ability to do so would be undercut by smuggling of fuel products from neighboring countries. Therefore, beyond the point of administered prices where the black market price is at P 00 bm ¼ P Ã (i.e. at any administered price P Ã ! P a ! P 00 a ), subsequent official price adjustments would result in the supply of fuel products remaining at Q Ã , with the monopolist's overall rent collection being at In a static world with complete information and constant international price P Ã , administered prices could be increased up to a point where they are equal to P Ã , allowing the market to clear at point C in Figure 5 . There will be no shortages at that point, and the monopolist will generate no rents. In the real world, however, unless the administered prices are constantly adjusted in line with changing international prices, there will be room for the monopolist to capture rents, create shortages (with subsequent inflationary implications), and for the economy as a whole to accrue deadweight loses from the monopolistic behavior.
The administered approach to price adjustments (from A to B to C) requires continuous adjustment of administered prices to reach market clearing and limit rent seeking at all times. In reality, however, continuous adjustment of administrative prices is unworkable, and even frequent adjustment of administrative prices will not eliminate shortages because the incentive of the monopolist to manipulate supply is restored every time international prices deviate from administrative prices. Instead, full liberalization of the fuel market to allow private sector imports will always keep the market at an (adjustable) point C and will help eliminate deadweight losses. From a practical point of view, this may require implementing a one-time administrative adjustment to reach the international price level. From that point on, however, the government will have to take upon itself a different function of monitoring the fuel market to prevent collusions and any other forms of strategic price-setting behavior by the private sector participants.
Fuel shortages can also have implications for the non-oil economy. As demonstrated above, in response to an increase in administered prices for fuel products, the quantity supplied declines resulting in a shortage, which pushes up the black market price. A combination of higher fuel prices (both administered and black market) as well as their availability will drive up the prices of non-oil products (à la Humpage and Pelz 2002) . These two effects can be reinforcing, however. Assuming a simple Leontieff-type technology, it can be shown that quantity of fuel products supplied (constrained in this case by rentseeking and violence) can have an additional impact on production and distribution of non-oil goods, beyond that suggested by the increase in the administered price for fuel products. 14 14 The assumption of a Leontieff-type technology for production (and distribution) of non-oil goods is plausible here given that the technology is fixed in the short run and is unlikely to change drastically given the security situation.
In sum, the predictions of the model are as follows: -Prior to adjusting the administered prices, the market is in an equilibrium, with black market prices stable and determined by the level of administered prices and the monopolist's marginal revenue schedule; -In response to an increase in administered prices, the monopolist reduces the supply of fuel products to the market. Although demand also falls in response to the new price, black market prices for fuel products are pushed up. This drives a wedge between headline and core inflation measures; -In the limit, where administered prices are raised to the same level as international prices, shortages will disappear because the monopolist no longer has an incentive to restrict supply of fuel products since his costs (the administered prices he pays to the central budget) equal his potential revenues; -Depending on the nature of the production process, reduction in the supply of oil or higher (black market) prices will create supply bottlenecks for the production and distribution of non-oil products, resulting in higher core inflation.
4 Empirical estimation
Empirical evidence
It appears that the above model is able to explain the stylized facts outlined in Section 2. First, the model predicts that when there are no changes in administered prices, the black market price for fuel remains constant, despite movements in international prices. In other words, when administered prices are stable, core inflation will be broadly in line with headline inflation. Once the administered price adjustments are introduced, however, black market prices will increase, generating fuel price inflation and driving a wedge between headline and core inflation. This is consistent with stylized fact 1. Second, the model correctly predicts the level of the black market prices vis-à-vis international prices. While increasing in response to administered price adjustments, the black market prices for fuel products have remained below international/regional prices at all times ( Figure 6 ). This is consistent with stylized fact 2. Third, the model predicts that black market prices will not increase as much as the underlying administered price adjustments, leading to a decline in monopoly mark-ups or black market premia. (This is due to the fact that the marginal revenue curve is sloped twice as steep as the demand curve. See Figure 6 for comparative statics). This is consistent with stylized fact 3. Fourth, the model predicts that there will always be shortages of fuel products unless administered prices are raised to the level of international prices. This is consistent with stylized fact 4. The model also predicts that liberalizing the fuel market by allowing private sector imports may help eliminate shortages stemming from misalignment between international and administered prices.
It turns out that the available data fit the model well. To demonstrate this we constructed the marginal revenue curve of the monopolist. 15 The (implied) demand curve was then derived, drawing on the relationship between the demand and the marginal revenue schedules, and we plotted the black market prices. Note that, as predicted by the model, any combinations of administered prices and quantity of fuel sold observed in the data are those on the marginal revenue curve (and not on the demand curve), while the black market prices for fuel products will be located along the demand curve at any quantity sold. It appears that the model does reasonably well in predicting the (location and the movement of the) black market prices in response to administered price 15 The marginal revenue curve is based on eq.
[2]. We assume a second-order quadratic specification to fit the data better.
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adjustments. As shown in Figure 7 , following the adjustment of gasoline prices to ID 175 per liter in June 2006, the amount supplied to the market dropped to 14.8 million liters per month, with the black market price jumping to ID 710 per liter. The model's own prediction of that black market price -located on the imputed demand curve -appears to be very close at around ID 650 per liter.
Econometric analysis
To further test our model, we employ a simple econometric model to explain headline and core inflation in Iraq. We divide the determinants of inflation into two groups: conventional and unconventional. Consistent with the empirical literature (e.g. Lissovolik (2003) , Liu and Adedeji (2000) , Ubide (1997) , among others), we included measures of monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies as conventional determinants. 16 The second set of indicators includes an indicator of violence and a proxy for shortages. As discussed above, the shortages can be due either to security-related factors or be the result of monopolistic behavior in fuel distribution. Violence can also impact non-oil market developments. For simplicity, the estimated equation can be shown in the following additive fashion:
The terms in the first set of brackets -proxy for oil shortages and violence indicator, V -represent the supply-side bottlenecks that affect prices in the oil and non-oil sectors. As discussed above, we use the administered prices for fuel products as an inverse proxy for shortages. 17 We use the number of troops killed and the number of civilians killed as proxies for violence. 18 The terms in the second set of brackets -reserve money, M, as a proxy for the money supply, 19 the government wage bill G, as a proxy for fiscal spending, and the exchange rate, E -are proxies for the demand side pressures. We also included seasonal dummies in the regressions. Both measures of inflation P, headline and core, were used. A description of the data and sources is in the Appendix.
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17 Note that the administered prices have a relatively small weight in the calculation of the fuel price index in Iraq (26%, with the remainder being accounted for by black market prices), which itself has only a 2.1% weight in the overall basket, and are unlikely to serve as true price/ reference point for fuel products for the vast majority of market participants. This should limit the risk of direct collinearity between administered prices and inflation measures.
18 Chaney (2008) uses the same indicators as control variables in an analysis that uses the variation in the Iraqi sovereign bond spreads to evaluate pacification policy in Iraq.
19 To the extent that the exchange rate has been kept fixed for most of the period under review (and the capital account was free), it is possible that the money supply was endogenously determined by nominal income/prices, rather than the other way around. Absent reliable and long time series on income measures, we could not test this in the context of this study. We do, however, expect that lagging the reserve money should reduce the extent of this endogeneity problem. Related to this, although the pervasive dollarization would make the growth of dinar money supply an imperfect predictor of inflation (as it would understate the extent of totalthat is, dinar plus dollar -money supply growth), it was practically impossible for us to find an adequate measure of cash dollars circulating in the economy. Hence we used only dinar reserve money as a measure of money supply. 20 A point regarding the quality of inflation data in Iraq is warranted at this juncture. It is quite conceivable that divergence of violence across regions had implications on the ability of staff in regional statistical offices to secure accurate data. Therefore, while to the best of our knowledge the data we use have consistent geographical coverage, to the extent that the violence may have had implications on the quality of data collected, the country-wide inflation data might somewhat inaccurately describe price movements across the country. However, at this point we are unable to either test or control for this (potentially minor) effect in our analysis.
Eq.
[3] was estimated using month-on-month percentage change of the relevant price indexes for the period of January 2004 through March 2007. 21 One to three lags of each indicator were used to arrive at the final specifications. Due to the short length of the time series and the underlying unstable economic environment in Iraq, the econometric estimates should be treated with caution.
The results, reported in Table 2 , however, are consistent with expectations and shed some additional light on the above discussion. They can be summarized as follows: -As expected, the proxy for fuel shortages appears to be a strong predictor of headline inflation, but not of core inflation, thus explaining the wedge between headline and core inflation. Also consistent with the prediction on the importance of quantity of fuel supplied in the non-oil sector, the quantity of gasoline available on the market is a strong predictor of core inflation. -There is evidence that violence is associated with higher inflation. However, the link is mostly with core inflation, indicating a stronger effect of violence on non-fuel commodity supplies than on fuel commodity supplies. -Despite the relatively stable path of the exchange rate for most of the period in question, it has a strong positive impact on prices, both headline and core. The estimates suggest that a 10% appreciation is likely to result in almost 8% reduction of headline inflation and 6-7% reduction of core inflation. If Iraq's real exchange rate was indeed appreciating gradually to a new equilibrium, this strong pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation suggests that the strategy to allow the nominal exchange rate to appreciate since November 2006 to reduce inflation was justified. -Money growth has a small but positive impact on both headline and core inflation. The results suggest that a 10% increase in reserve money would result in only 3 percentage points of additional inflation. This lends support to the assumption of a weak monetary transmission mechanism. It also points to an increase in real demand for money linked to the growth of the (non-oil) economy. -The magnitude (and significance) of the constant (including seasonal dummies) in columns 3 and 4 -about 20% per annum for the observation period or roughly ¾ of the average monthly core inflation -suggests that there is a persistent underlying trend in core inflation. In light of the de facto pegged nominal exchange rate for most of the period under review, this could well be due to the adjustment of the real exchange rate to a new, higher equilibrium level as discussed above, or supply-side adjustments (e.g. catching up). -The results did not reveal a significant impact of fluctuation in the government's wage and pension bill (a proxy for the overall fiscal stance) on inflation, and we have dropped this variable from our final estimation results. However, this may mean that fluctuations in fiscal spending have not been inflationary and does not necessarily imply that the fiscal stance did not have an impact on the core rate of inflation. Moreover, this result Subsequent research could attempt to look at the impact of the level of fiscal spending on inflation dynamics. -There seems to be a strong seasonality present in inflation, especially headline inflation. Headline inflation in the fourth quarter of each year was 4% higher (month-on-month) by comparison to other quarters, other things being equal. 23 This is consistent with the timing of Ramadan, which fell in the final quarter of each year during 2004-06. The inability of supply -of both oil and non-oil products -to catch up with demand during Ramadan (thus generating sizable price hikes) provides indirect evidence of the existence of supply bottlenecks. -There appears to be no path dependency in inflation during the observed period.
ConclusionS
Since the invasion in 2003, inflation in Iraq has been high, and in 2006 it increased sharply. Our findings show that inflation may have been influenced by shortages in fuel and non-fuel commodity supplies themselves driven by violence and rent-seeking behavior in the fuel distribution sector. We also conjecture that trend inflation may have been influenced by adjustment of the real exchange rate to a new (appreciated) equilibrium in the context of improved terms of trade and a fixed exchange rate. The results suggest that, while raising administered fuel prices may contribute to inflation in the short run, raising such prices to international levels would eliminate rent-seeking and thereby help reduce inflation. The fuel monopolist has an incentive to engage in behavior that is socially sub-optimal by suppressing the supply of oil products and keeping it below market equilibrium levels.
Given the focus on supply shortages as a factor in driving inflation in Iraq, the findings also provide strong support for the government's policy of 22 Measuring the domestic component of the fiscal envelope proved impossible. 23 The signs of the quarterly dummies in the equations of core inflation indicate that inflation is higher in Q1, by about 2%, which could reflect a longer pass-through from supply to price adjustments for food and other non-fuel products than for fuel products.
liberalizing the importation and distribution of fuel products and allow the private sector to freely operate in this sector. Bringing fuel prices closer to international levels would help reduce shortages but does not change the underlying incentives of the fuel monopolist to maximize and collect rent by supplying less than what the market could consume at any given price. It is clear that full convergence of both prices and quantities toward the equilibrium levels will be achieved through liberalization of the supply network to allow the private imports of gasoline. These policies have helped reduce inflation from 65% at end-2006 to single digits in the last quarter of 2008.
The econometric results presented in the paper also highlight the important role that the continuing violence has played in hindering efforts to reduce inflation. The effect of violence is stronger for non-fuel commodity supplies than for fuel commodity supplies.
Finally, the result shows a strong pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation which supports the government's policy of a gradual appreciation of the exchange rate to control inflation.
Appendix: Description of variables
Our sample includes monthly data between January 2004 and March 2007. Although data availability for Iraq has improved in recent years, problems with methodology and limits of coverage remain. We acknowledge these data limitations as potentially influencing the robustness of our estimates. Reported by the Ministry of Finance. -Supply of gasoline is the total volume of imported and domestically produced gasoline supplied to the Iraqi market. The data are reported by the Word Bank based on information obtained from the MoO.
